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Abstract. There exist many obstacles that slow the global adoption of public 
key infrastructure (PKI) technology. The PKI interoperability problem, being 
poorly understood, is one of the most confusing. In this paper, we clarify the 
PKI interoperability issue by exploring both the juridical and technical domains. 
We demonstrate the origin of the PKI interoperability problem by determining 
its root causes, the latter being legal, organizational and technical differences 
between countries, which mean that relying parties have no one to rely on. We 
explain how difficult it is to harmonize them. Finally, we propose to handle the 
interoperability problem from the trust management point of view, by introduc-
ing the role of a trust broker which is in charge of helping relying parties make 
informed decisions about X.509 certificates. 
Keywords: PKI, X.509, Trust, Interoperability. 
1 Introduction 
While the potential of PKIs is high, this technology continues to suffer from many 
problems that slow its global adoption. In 2003, the OASIS technical committee in-
vestigated the reasons that prevent the widespread adoption of PKI technology. The 
major results of this survey [1] are: 
· Poor PKIs interoperability; 
· Too much legal work required; 
· Hard for end users to use; 
· PKI poorly understood. 
Although this survey was undertaken in 2003, the issues related to interoperability, 
complexity of legal work and the difficulty of use by end users are still accurate and 
still cause severe problems. 
These issues are not mutually exclusive; they are highly related to each other. The 
interoperability problem is the most difficult one, because it is the most complex and 
confusing. Peter Smith has highlighted the complexity of PKI interoperability [2]: 
“[PKI] interoperability is something of a will-o’-the-wisp. You think you understand 
what people mean by it, and then quickly realize that you don’t. In my experience, it’s 
possible when discussing interoperability to be at cross-purposes for all of the time}". 
If such a group of experts has difficulties to cope with this issue, how can we imagine 
an unskilled person can perform this task? Today, users of certificates, and in par-
ticular relying parties, are left on their own to face this problem”. 
In this paper, we open Pandora’s Box by trying to explain the reasons for the in-
teroperability problem in the field of PKIs. We show that the problem cannot be 
solved by defining harmonized juridical, organizational and technical rules, especially 
because of the cultural/juridical differences between countries. Thus, PKIs today are 
isolated islands; each PKI seeks to comply only with the requirements of the jurisdic-
tion where their root CA premises are located.  
Although explaining the PKI interoperability issue is the main objective of this pa-
per, our research is also aimed at resolving this problem from a trust management 
point of view. Our proposed solution is also briefly presented. Our trust management 
based approach requires defining a new role, the trust broker, which will help relying 
parties to evaluate the risks and to take informed decisions about using the certificates 
of remote users, which they have obtained. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains what exactly a 
public key infrastructure is. It presents the main involved entities and PKI deployment 
models. In section 3, we illustrate the problem of PKI interoperability and show how 
it is difficult to solve the problem by defining harmonized juridical and technical rules 
between countries. In section 4, we present our proposition that consists in handling 
the interoperability problem from a trust management point of view. We also briefly 
present our proposal to define a new trusted third party, the trust broker, and we 
demonstrate the feasibility of our proposal. Finally, in section 5 we present our con-
clusions. 
2 What is a public key infrastructure? 
Many definitions of a PKI exist. The American Bar Association (ABA) defines a 
PKI as: “The sum total of the hardware, software, people, processes, and policies 
that, together, using the technology of asymmetric cryptography, facilitate the crea-
tion of a verifiable association between a public key (the public component of an 
asymmetric key pair) and the identity (and/or other attributes) of the holder of the 
corresponding private key (the private component of that pair), for uses such as au-
thenticating the identity of a specific entity, ensuring the integrity of information, 
providing support for non repudiation, and establishing an encrypted communica-
tions section”. 
Thus, a PKI is not only a set of computers used for generating the key pairs and the 
associated certificates. It is also the set of policies, processes and people responsible 
for a certificate’s life cycle management. The certification authority (CA), which 
asserts the correctness of the certificate information by appending its signature on the 
certificate, is the main entity of this infrastructure. 
A PKI is based on a trust model described by the X.509 standard (Fig. 1). The 
model is composed of three entities: the certification authority (CA), the certificate 
holder and the relying party (RP). The CA plays the role of trusted third party by 
guarantying the correctness of the certificate information to the RP. Thus, the CA 
trusts the certificate holder and so issues it with a public key certificate. The relying 
party trusts the CA for the validity of the certificate’s information. Consequently the 
relying party can indirectly trust the certificate holder for the current transaction. 
According to RFC 5280, which defines an X.509 certificate profile for the Internet, 
an RP has the obligation to review the CA policy documents before accepting a certif-
icate. It declares: “A certificate user should review the certificate policy generated by 
the certification authority (CA) before relying on the authentication or non-
repudiation services associated with the public key in a particular certificate”. 
 
Fig. 1. X.509 trust model 
To respect this obligation an RP must typically read two documents: the Certificate 
Policy (CP) and the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) documents. The CP doc-
ument defines the application domain of a certificate and the security requirements to 
be realized by the CA. The CPS document defines how the CA has implemented the 
security requirements. It must be fairly obvious to anyone that this is a ludicrous re-
quirement to place on most computer users. 
Two different deployment models can be distinguished for PKIs: the closed and the 
open models. The closed model is usually applied to contexts with limited scope such 
as a collaboration between organizations where each organization manages its own 
PKI including one or more CAs. All the relationships between all the entities (RPs, 
CAs and certificates holders) participating in the collaboration are clarified through 
agreed contracts between the involved organizations. 
In the open model, the relationship between a CA and certificate holders is also 
clarified by contracts. But, there is no such explicit contractual relationship between 
the CA and the relying parties (RPs). Therefore, the regulation of the relationships 
between a CA and the RPs is defined in legislative and regulatory frameworks rather 
than contracts. However, the lack of consensus between countries about the imple-
mentation of these frameworks or the way that PKIs should be regulated has given 
rise to the problem of interoperability between PKIs in this open model. 
3 The PKI interoperability obstacle 
Generally, two kinds of regulations can be identified: economic regulations and social 
regulations [3]. The objective of the economic regulations is to increase economic 
efficiency by reducing barriers to competition and innovation, often by deregulation. 
The objective of the social regulations is to protect the public interests such as health, 
safety and the environment. Thus economic interests come as secondary concern to 
the social regulations. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Regulation layers 
A PKI depends on three layers of regulations: juridical, organizational and tech-
nical (Fig. 2). PKI interoperability requires compatibility at these three layers. Cur-
rently, profound differences still exist between countries at each layer: juridical, or-
ganizational and technical. In the following sections, we try to interpret what the in-
teroperability problem actually means by exposing the juridical, organizational and 
technical differences that exist between countries. 
3.1 Juridical differences 
The implementation of a PKI requires the processing of different legal issues: how to 
recognize electronic signatures, the validity of electronic contracts, the legal responsi-
bilities of the involved entities (CAs, certificate holders and RPs) and the privacy 
rules. 
Generally, the legal differences that exist today come from the different legal tradi-
tions that have evolved and are now being followed in the different countries. There 
are mainly two different traditions: the common-law tradition that relies on legal 
precedent to assess legal affairs, and the civil-law tradition that relies on the existence 
of laws rather than decisions of courts to assess legal affairs [4]. Consequently coun-
tries have treated all the legal issues related to PKIs according to their different legal 
traditions. 
Differences concerning the legal recognition of electronic signatures. Three dif-
ferent approaches exist for validating electronic signatures: (a) the minimalist ap-
proach; (b) the technology-specific approach and (c) the two-tiered approach [6]. 
The minimalist approach is based on the principle of technological neutrality, 
which gives a minimum legal effect to all technologies. The principle of technological 
neutrality ensures that the legislation remains valid even when the technologies be-
come obsolete. This approach is often applied in common law countries such as the 
US, UK and Australia. Under this approach, electronic signatures are equivalent to 
handwritten signatures if they fulfill certain functions. In case of dispute, the validity 
of electronic signatures is established a posteriori by a judge, or by a public authority 
[5]. 
In the technology specific-approach, laws favor one form of electronic signature; 
usually digital signatures. In this case, laws specify technical, juridical and financial 
requirements imposed on CAs in order to validate electronic signatures generated by 
their certificates. The disadvantage of this approach is that it makes uncertain the 
legal status of other types of electronic signature. The Utah State was the first to adopt 
such a law in 1995. 
The two-tiered approach combines the advantages of both previous approaches. 
It is often followed in countries whose tradition is civil-law. It provides a balance 
between flexibility and certainty by setting minimum requirements for all types of 
electronic signatures and at the same time by defining a clear legal effect for certain 
forms of electronic signature that meet specific technical requirements. The European 
Union has adopted this approach through its directive 1999/93/EC on electronic sig-
natures. 
Differences about the legal validity of electronic contracts. There are two types 
of electronic contract: contract at a click “clickwrap contract” and contract at naviga-
tion “browsewrap contract”. A “clickwrap contract” is a contract to which a consum-
er must agree by clicking the icon “I agree” before completing the transaction. A 
browsewrap contract, which is often accessible using links labeled “Legal” or “Terms 
of Use”, is so named because such agreements state that a web site user is bound 
simply by “browsing” the web site [8]. In other words, the term browsewrap refers to 
any contract not requiring an explicit manifestation of assent. 
Electronic contracts, whether they are browsewrap or clickwrap, are both consid-
ered a contract of adhesion. These contracts do not allow for negotiation; they are 
based on the principle “take it or leave it” where one party is restricted to accept all 
the terms prepared by the other powerful party. These contracts usually raise ques-
tions about the fairness to the weaker party. 
Countries like the US tend to regularize electronic contracts mainly based on only 
the traditional laws of contracts, whilst other countries like those in Europe, add dif-
ferent extensions to the traditional laws of contracts [7]. By consulting case law han-
dled until 30-06-2008 by the American courts [8], electronic contracts have been in-
validated in the following cases: 
· If it is not possible to prove that the consumer has obviously noted the existence 
of an electronic contract. (However, if a consumer has noticed the existence of a 
contract, it will be valid even if the consumer did not read the clauses); 
· If the contract has been modified by the powerful party without notifying the 
weak party ; 
· If the electronic contract infringes the traditional doctrines of contract laws (e.g. 
kids rules, unfairness rules, etc.). 
Laws regulating contracts differ between the US and the EU mainly because of the 
EU directive on unfair contract terms (which regulates contracts offered by merchants 
to consumers whether online or offline); the distance selling directive (which regu-
lates transactions between remote merchants and consumers, whether by means of 
television, telemarketing, Internet or other electronic communications medium) and 
the Electronic Commerce Directive (which promotes transparency and accountability 
in online commerce) [7]. Annex 1 of the EU directive on unfair contracts contains a 
list of terms that may be considered abusive. It provides examples of unfair terms. In 
France, the directive was extended by national legislation to make the use of the 
French language mandatory. Although countries like Canada, Australia and the UK 
share a common legal culture with the US, nevertheless their approaches to consumer 
protection have been similar to the EU approach [9]. 
In the context of PKIs, a consumer can be at the same time a RP and a certificate 
holder. CAs try to regularize their relations with RPs and certificate holders through 
electronic contracts rather than written contracts due to their remote nature. These 
contracts contain information about different issues, such as: the responsibility and 
obligations of certificate holders towards the CA and RPs and vice-versa, the identifi-
cation of the jurisdiction where the dispute will be held in case of problems, the arbi-
tration procedures before filing complaints against a CA, the limitation of a CA’s 
liability, and regulations about holding the personal information of consumers, etc. 
Contracts between CAs and certificate holders are generally of type “clickwrap”, 
because CAs are always asking the consent of certificate holders when their certifi-
cates are issued. Electronic contracts for RPs are of type “browsewrap” because these 
contracts are placed in the extensions of certificates; and a RP must inspect the exten-
sions of a certificate to find the related electronic contract. Given the difficulty of 
access to the contract, it seems probable that courts would invalidate these contracts 
because RPs are not usually aware of their existence, and sometimes not even of the 
certificate. In the EU, if the consumer has not agreed explicitly before the conclusion 
of a transaction, the contract is not valid. Similarly in the US, courts may consider the 
contract inadequate when the CA cannot prove the RP has read the conditions of use 
of a certificate prior to its use. Consequently, different countries try to regulate direct-
ly the relationship between the involved parties (CAs, certificate holders and RPs) by 
issuing explicit laws handling the rights and the liability of each party. This point is 
presented in detail below. 
Differences about the liability of the involved entities. Liability issues play an 
important role in the relationship between RPs, certificates holders and CAs. Regulat-
ing liability issues can be executed in two ways: by contract or by law. Relations be-
tween the CA and the certificate holder are contractual, whereas relations between 
CAs and RPs are not based on contracts in the open model. 
Differences between countries about liability issues can be recognized in three 
main areas: the extent that laws cover the involved parties, the burden of proof and 
the possibility to limit the liability of CAs. Concerning the extent that laws cover the 
involved parties, four categories can be identified [5]: 
· No specific provisions on liability; 
· Provisions on liability rules only for suppliers of PKIs ; 
· Rules of liability for certificate holders and suppliers of PKIs; 
· Liability rules for all the parties. 
The differences between jurisdictions appear also on the designation of the party 
which has the burden of proof in case of a problem. There are two main options: Or-
dinary negligence where it is the responsibility of the injured party to demonstrate that 
the damage was caused by the other party’s fault or breach of its obligations, and 
presumed negligence where a party’s fault is presumed whenever damage has resulted 
from an act attributable to it (e.g. directive 1999/93/EC).  
Finally, the ability of the PKI providers to limit their responsibilities has been 
treated differently between countries. CAs try systematically to limit their responsibil-
ities towards certificate holders and RPs. Although most legal systems recognize the 
right of CAs to limit or to exclude their responsibilities through contractual arrange-
ments, this right has been subject to various restrictions and conditions [5]. 
Differences about privacy rules. CAs could have problems related to privacy. To 
generate certificates, CAs need to collect a set of personal and business information 
about people requesting certificates. Governments have adopted different approaches 
to regularize the legal rules related to privacy. The difference between the US and EU 
approaches to social and economic regulations also influences the rules for the protec-
tion of personal information. In the EU, the protection of private information is con-
sidered a basic human right. In the US however, the person who collects and stores 
private information is supposed to be the owner, unless a specific law creates a right 
for the data subject for a specific type of personal information [10]. 
3.2 Organizational differences 
The organization of a PKI varies from one country to another depending on the level 
of intervention of governments, which is generally considered in most countries to be 
a means of trust enhancement. Three main models can be identified [5]: 
· Self-regulation: In this model, an organization can start up a PKI business with-
out any prior accreditation. No license is required. The US is an example of this; 
· Limited government intervention: some governments establish a voluntary ac-
creditation system. Under this system, a PKI provider is not forced to search for 
a license. But licensed PKIs have more advantages than unlicensed PKI provid-
ers. The audit of PKIs is normally done by entities accredited by the concerned 
government. Singapore and the EU are examples of this model; 
· Complete control of governments: Governments setup mandatory accreditation 
systems where PKI providers are forced to get a license before starting their 
business. Governments also conduct the audit process. China and Malaysia fol-
low this model. 
The level of technological and administrative maturity in a country plays an im-
portant role in determining the appropriate organizational model for PKIs. It is diffi-
cult to exclude the intervention of governments in countries whose technological and 
administrative maturity is not sufficiently developed. In these countries, governments 
must intervene to facilitate the using of a new technology. Winn et al [11] present an 
example that shows how the intervention of the Chinese government has contributed 
to the success of the market in accounting software in China. The study shows that 
this success was due to government intervention in the market. It shows also that the 
organizational model of self-regulation for accounting software has been successfully 
adopted when the market has reached a certain level of maturity. 
3.3 Technical differences 
It has never been easy to define a common set of standards between countries. The 
structure of standards developing organizations (SDOs) varies across countries ac-
cording to their political, economical and legal structures. SDOs in the US operate 
outside any form of public control and focus solely on market conditions, while the 
EU SDOs are under government surveillance and are guided by both the social and 
economic expectations of the market [14]. 
Winn, J. K. [14, 20] demonstrates this difficulty by contrasting the standardization 
processes adopted in the US and the EU. 
Standardization process in the US. Most standards are developed by private or-
ganizations such as the National Fire Protection Association, and the Institute of Elec-
trical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). In order for a standard produced by these 
organizations to be recognized as an “American National Standards” by the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI), the procedures followed to develop that standard 
must meet the “essential requirements” established by ANSI. These are designed to 
ensure fairness in the procedures used for developing these standards [14]. 
One of the advantages to private organizations of being accredited by ANSI is that 
it will be easier for them to have their standards submitted to ISO, and they can then 
get international recognition. However, meeting all the requirements of ANSI could 
slow the development process, especially since it can be difficult to obtain a consen-
sus from all the participants. For example, some participants who are developing pro-
prietary technologies can deliberately delay the development of a public standard in 
order to drive the market to adopt their own proprietary technology [14]. 
The suppliers of IT products need a flexible development process for standards. 
They prefer generally to work with consortiums because they can adapt more rapidly 
to market evolutions than the traditional standardization organizations. Consortiums 
have generally a limited number of participants and simplified development proce-
dures for standards. 
In the US, many de facto standards exist in the context of PKIs. One of the best 
known is the “extended validation certificate” standard [15]. It describes a set of tech-
nical and legal criteria that CAs must meet in order to generate “extended validation” 
certificates, which are used to authenticate web servers. The standard is established by 
a group of commercial CAs and by the producers of well known web browsers such 
as Firefox and Internet Explorer. 
Standardization process in the EU. Governments tend to play a more important 
role in the elaboration of standards. EU countries usually have one National Standards 
Body (NSB) responsible for managing all the national standards.  The EU has adopted 
a strategy called the “New Approach” in order to harmonize the efforts of law reform 
with the efforts of standards’ development between the member states. In the New 
Approach, after the preparation of a directive that defines the “essential requirements” 
related to one issue, the standardization process will be initiated by one of the three 
recognized organizations in Europe for the development of standards: the European 
Committee for Standardization (CEN), the European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization (CENELEC) and the European Telecommunications Standards Insti-
tute (ETSI). The European Commission (EC) may then send an observer to verify 
whether the resulting standards meet the essential requirements of the legislation of 
the directive. 
However, it is difficult to adapt the “New Approach” strategy to the development 
of ICT standards; this is partly because the process of the New Approach to the de-
velopment of standards is much slower than the simple process of informal standardi-
zation followed in the US for developing ICT standards [12]. 
The EU directive on electronic signatures is a light version of the New Approach; 
unlike the directives based on the traditional New Approach, the electronic signature 
directive doesn’t require the development of formal standards to support compliance 
to the directive of electronic signatures [20]. CEN, CENELEC and ETSI have intro-
duced new types of products, such as CEN CWAs (Workshop Agreements), ETSI TS 
(Technical Specifications) and GS (Group Specifications), for accompanying the 
rapid evolution of the ICT market, and for facing the growing influence of interna-
tional consortia working outside the EU. These products provide an alternative to the 
formal rigid process of standardization for the development of formal European 
Norms (ENs). 
The work of developing standards for electronic signatures has been entrusted to 
the “European Electronic Signature Standardization Initiative” (EESSI). EESSI is an 
ad hoc body set up under the aegis of “the Information and Communications Tech-
nologies Standards Board (ICTSB)”, an organization that specializes in coordination 
between the European standards bodies CEN, CENELEC and ETSI. EESSI’s work 
was completed in 2003 and published in the Official Journal. As a consequence, the 
differences in strategies for developing standards have resulted in different standards 
in the domain of PKIs. 
3.4 Discussion 
Neither the US nor the EU has found an effective way to promote the adoption of 
PKI technologies. In the US, the removal of legal, technical and organizational barri-
ers in the market of PKIs has not led to the establishment of strong mechanisms for 
authentication and signatures. By promoting the unregulated competition among pro-
viders of identity technologies, many technical solutions have been deployed in the 
market, but none of these solutions has really dominated the market. Consequently, 
identification and authentication for Internet transactions in the US remain mainly 
based on UserID/Password; despite the well known security problems associated with 
them [12]. In February 2005, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation released a 
report indicating the severity of the problem of identity theft in the US and concluded 
that reinforcing online identification systems is essential to solve the problem. This is 
why the Obama administration is trying to reduce fraud on the Internet by developing 
an ecosystem for online identity management at the national level. The administration 
is currently working on the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace. A 
draft of the proposal was publicly released at the end of June 2010 [13]. The identity 
ecosystem is based on four main principles: 
· The system will be secure and resilient; 
· The system will be interoperable; 
· The system will be privacy-enhancing and voluntary; 
· The system will be cost-effective and easy to use. 
However today, in the context of PKIs, the situation in the US remains unclear.  
Users must be able to assess the technical and legal risk resulting from the depend-
ence on various PKIs, which utilise different types of certificates with different levels 
of technical and juridical qualities. 
In other countries, such as the EU, which provide a minimum level of technical and 
legal protection for their citizens, the clarity of the situation at national level increases 
with the government’s level of intervention. However, the international situation re-
mains unclear. These countries have problems regarding the recognition of foreign 
certificates managed by foreign PKIs. For example, web browsers imposed the “ex-
tended validation” standard as a de facto solution for recognizing these certificates. 
Given the approach that has been followed for developing this standard, the EU coun-
tries could find this standard unfair to their citizens. Currently, there are not suffi-
ciently well developed mechanisms to give official recognition to the standards de-
veloped outside the EU’s borders. 
The various attempts that have been aimed at harmonizing the trust frameworks of 
PKIs between countries have not actually improved the situation. For example, the 
attempt by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
to harmonize the laws of different countries for the recognition of electronic signa-
tures has not achieved its objectives. The proposed harmonizing approach is flexible; 
it allows countries that have adopted it to modify it freely to suit their own needs. But 
this has led to creating interoperability problems [17]. 
In the EU, the legal, technical and organizational harmonization through the di-
rective on electronic signatures has not been a huge success. In 2007, a study, at the 
request of the EC found that the lack of interoperability between EU countries is one 
of the main factors that have contributed to the slow adoption of electronic signature 
technology in Europe [18]. In fact, in parallel with the standardization efforts of 
EESSI, some Member States have developed their own national standards such as 
ISIS-MTT in Germany, PRIS in France and SEIDE in Sweden. These standards have 
created additional interoperability problems between European countries. This is le-
gally possible in the EU because CWAs and TSs don’t have the same status as formal 
standards (ENs). Therefore, the obligation imposed on Member States to remove ex-
isting national standards that are inconsistent with European standards does not apply 
in the case of CWAs and TSs [19]. 
To face this problem, the EC is working on a new proposal to regulate electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market [23].  
The objective of this proposal is to enable cross-border secure transactions between 
European countries, both for the public and private sectors. Whilst directive 
1999/93/EC only covers electronic signatures, the new regulation defines a compre-
hensive framework that encompasses electronic identification, authentication and 
signatures.  It is too early to measure the success of the new regulation. However, the 
new regulation introduces certainty only for qualified trust services i.e. those that 
meet the requirements of the EC, and not other trust services that nevertheless are still 
authorized to sell their services in the EU market. Thus, uncertainty will still persist 
for the latter services. 
Today, new countries are starting to have an important role in the development of 
global standards (especially China, India and Korea). For example, Scott Kennedy 
explains [16] that the investment of China in standards development is to break the 
domination of western countries in this area. The quality of these standards can vary 
considerably, depending on the participants and the rules for participation established 
by the agency that develops the standards. 
As a consequence of these major differences, PKIs remain isolated islands in the 
open model. Each PKI seeks to comply only with the requirements of the jurisdiction 
where the premises of its root CA are located. Thus, the RPs have to handle this PKI 
interoperability issue in the end. The various harmonization attempts at regional and 
international level have not come up with a solution to the PKI interoperability prob-
lem. Trust architectures such as Bridge CAs or hierarchical CAs cannot help in re-
solving the problem in the open model since the main idea of these architectures is to 
prove the juridical, political and technical equivalence between CAs. However, be-
cause of the interoperability problems between countries, this equivalence is not fea-
sible. This is why Web browsers today contain many hierarchical CA roots, and not 
just one. 
4 Handling the interoperability problem from the trust 
management point of view 
The persistence of interoperability problems creates a trust management problem, 
i.e. how can an RP trust one CA or another when certificates have different levels of 
quality? If there was a compatibility between PKIs at the juridical, organizational and 
technical levels, there would not exist a trust management issue because in this case a 
limited number of classes of globally accepted certificates could be defined, where 
each class could meet a specific context of use. However, this theoretical solution 
cannot be implemented in practice because of the reasons presented in section 3. 
We propose to handle the interoperability problem by transforming it into a trust 
management problem. Establishing trust in a certificate requires managing technical, 
organizational and legal issues. This task is extremely complex, therefore only tech-
nical and legal experts can perform it. It is not conceivable to delegate this task to the 
RPs which generally are unskilled people. 
In the closed PKI model, the administrators of the CAs and the lawyers of each or-
ganization play the roles of technical and legal experts to help the employees of the 
organization in dealing with certificates coming from other organizations. RPs and the 
experts, being part of the same organization/company, have a trust relationship which 
is naturally created. The trust of the RPs in their administrators is not only related to 
the quality of the certificates they are issued with but also to the CAs they are recom-
mended or allowed to trust. In addition, interconnection topologies are often built for 
a predefined number of services related to the nature of the collaboration between the 
organizations. Thus, the trust decisions of the RPs can be automatically configured. 
In the open model, the situation is far more complex than the closed model for sev-
eral reasons (Fig. 3). There is no explicit and balanced predefined trust relationship 
between RPs and experts. Web browsers implicitly play the role of expert as they 
manage the list of trusted CAs, but there is no agreement between the RPs and the 
browsers’ manufacturers to make them responsible for the information they provide. 
 
Fig. 3. Differences between the closed model and the open model  
Secondly, the scope of the certificate usage is more open (i.e., not limited to prede-
fined specific services). The consequence is that Web browsers don’t provide enough 
information to make an informed decision. The recommendation is binary (trusted or 
not recognized, e.g. an icon in the URL bar is blue or not). Trusted CAs are all stored 
in the same trusted list. CAs with different levels of quality are equally trusted regard-
less of the use of the certificate. 
All these ad-hoc solutions, either for the open (e.g. Web browser approach) or for 
the closed model (e.g. interconnection topologies), include implicitly the role of ex-
pert. The differences lie in the nature of the entities playing the role of expert, the type 
of trust linking the expert with the RPs, and the nature of the information that the 
expert supplies to RPs. We propose to clarify this situation by adding explicitly the 
role of a trusted expert to the X.509 trust model, in the form of a trust broker. RPs 
need to rely only on the trust broker and not on each and every CA issuing certificates 
to their holders. In this case, the X.509 trust model is fairer for the RPs. The trust 
broker evaluates objectively the CA and its certificates, and sends recommendations 
to RPs that helps them to make informed decisions about these certificates (Fig. 4-A). 
The relation between the trust broker and the RPs must be regularized by explicit 
agreements. In such agreements, the trust broker recognizes its responsibility to the 
RPs about the provided recommendations and requires itself to respect and to protect 
the privacy of the RPs. On the other side, the trust broker must be independent from 
the CAs. Its relationship with CAs must also be regularized by explicit agreements, so 
that the trust broker can transfer the responsibility to a CA when a false recommenda-
tion is made resulting from incorrect information provided by the CA. 
The contractual agreements between the RPs and the trust brokers create trust 
communities. The role of trust broker could be provided by: 
· Commercial organizations which make a business from giving recommenda-
tion about certificates; 
· National governments which wish to facilitate e-commerce in their countries; 
· An international body like the UN in order to facilitate international trade. 
 
Fig. 4. The Trust Broker 
Finally, to help RPs to make informed decisions about certificates, the trust broker 
must provide contextual recommendations. For example, recommendations about a 
certificate that authenticates an email server should be different from recommenda-
tions about a certificate that authenticates an e-commerce server. This is because the 
information sent by the RP to the certificate holder (login/passwd or credit card in-
formation) and the consequences of these transactions are different. In the first case, 
the critical information is the quality level of the certificate and the financial and ju-
ridical protection if the certificate is false. In the second case, this information should 
be supplemented with the maximum transaction amount that can be used in order to 
stay covered by the financial protection offered in the CP/CPS.  
We have already proposed that the next version of X.509 contains the trust broker 
as a new trusted third party for RPs, and the current working draft of X.509 (2016) 
[24] contains the four cornered model shown in Fig 4-A. We have also started an 
implementation of a trust broker service and protocol. We call it the “unified ap-
proach” because it is applicable to both the open and closed deployment models of 
PKIs (Fig. 4-B). When an RP receives a certificate, its client sends a query to the trust 
broker asking it about the trustworthiness of the certificate. The trust broker responds 
by providing three types of information: 
· Quality of Certificate (QoCER): a score between 0 and 1 representing the level 
of trust that can be placed in the certificate; 
· Confidence Level (CL): a score between 0 and 1 that indicates to what extent 
the trust broker is confident in the QoCER recommendation sent to the RP; 
· Usage information about the recommended or allowed uses of the certificate.  
The RP’s proposed certificate’s use is only provided to its client rather than to the 
trust broker for privacy reasons. Consequently the trust broker has to enumerate all 
the allowed uses for the certificate. This list should be structured enough to allow the 
client to match the appropriate use and present this to the RP. For example, the list 
could contain: {“Bank Server authentication”, “E-mail server authentication”, “Buy-
ing a product with 5000$ maximum”, “multimedia server authentication”, etc.}. Part 
of our future research is to determine the way this information should be structured in 
order to allow efficient matching. If there is no intersection between the proposed use 
and the trust broker’s list, then the client will recommend the RP not to use the certifi-
cate. Further information about the calculation of OCER, CL and the usage parame-
ters can be found in [22]. Once we have finished the pilot implementation we propose 
to offer the protocol to a standards body such as the IETF of OASIS. 
A direct application of our work could be to help RPs to decide about the juridical 
validity of a digital signature apposed on a document. The juridical validity of a digi-
tal signature depends in part on the quality of the CA’s management procedures of the 
certificate used to validate the signature. The score of QoCER represents in this case 
the juridical validity of the signature and can help the RP to decide whether to accept 
the signed document or not. 
In previous research, Jon Olnes [21] introduced a new entity, called a “Validation 
Authority” (VA), to help RPs take decisions about certificates. It is similar to our 
concept of a trust broker. The relationship between a VA and RPs must be regularized 
through contractual agreements. However, the interoperability differences between 
countries are not explained and thereby the role of the VA is not completely justified. 
Additionally, the author doesn’t provide information about the nature of recommenda-
tions to send to RPs. Finally, the concept of contextual recommendations is not con-
sidered. 
5 Conclusion 
X.509 certificates have been widely adopted today for the realization of different 
security services. However, many problems still slow the adoption of this technology 
by (mainly human) RPs, one of them being the interoperability problem.  One of the 
objectives of this paper was to clarify the interoperability problem and we have shown 
that juridical, organizational and technical differences between countries are the main 
reasons for this problem. We have proposed to solve this from a trust management 
perspective, by extending the X.509 trust model to include a new trusted third party 
called the trust broker. We have also started to implement this role as a new TTP ser-
vice to be offered to RPs. 
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